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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the IRS took regulatory steps to correct a longstanding problem: 
inconsistent quality from tax preparers who are permitted to prepare tax returns but 
who are not part of any licensed class of professionals that would impose quality 
standards.1 Although tax commentators generally praised such steps, the IRS’s 
authority to increase the standards on this class of tax preparers was immediately 
                                                                                                                                         
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria 
School of Law.   
 1 See Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Ref. No. 2009-40-098, Inadequate Data on 
Paid Preparers Impedes Effective Oversight (2009) [hereinafter TIGTA Report] (for a 
discussion of the pre-2011 difficulties the IRS had in monitoring paid preparers); Patrick E. 
Tolan, Jr., It’s About Time: Registration and Regulation Will Boost Competence and 
Accountability of Paid Tax Preparers, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 471, 485-86, 503 (2012). 
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challenged, resulting in an initial loss for the government, which has recently been 
affirmed on appeal.2   
The IRS’s action to enhance the standards applicable to paid tax return preparers 
was one of a series of steps that the IRS has taken to combat what is known as the 
tax gap. The tax gap, simply put, is the difference between the amount of taxes that 
should be collected by the government if all taxpayers complied with their 
obligations and the amount that is actually collected.3 The most recent estimate from 
tax year 2006 shows a gross tax gap of $450 billion (indicating a compliance rate of 
83.1%).4 
Although the United States arguably has more of a culture of compliance than the 
rest of the world,5 the United States’ overall high compliance rate is deceptive 
because noncompliance does not exist evenly across all types of tax reporting and 
willingness to comply tends to correlate with whether the government is receiving 
third-party information related to a taxpayer’s tax liability.6 Illustrating the extremes 
in compliance rate differentials, there is only a 1% noncompliance rate for wage 
income (which is almost entirely reported by third parties), but there is an 
approximately 50% noncompliance rate for cash income, which is not subject to 
third-party reporting.7  
                                                                                                                                         
 2 See Bryan T. Camp, “Loving” Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457 (2013); 
Richard M. Lipton, “Tough Loving”: District Court Invalidates IRS Regulation of Return 
Preparers, 188 J. TAX’N 200 (2013) (discussing the IRS’ loss in Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 
2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), and the status of the subsequent history of the litigation). On February 
11, 2014, the D.C. Circuit panel unanimously affirmed the district court. Loving v. IRS, 742 
F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 3 I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-4 (Jan. 6, 2012) (“The tax gap is defined as the amount of 
tax liability faced by taxpayers that is not paid on time.”).  
 4 Id. 
 5 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 71, 86 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity]; Richard Lavoie, Flying 
Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying Ethos in those Playing by their 
Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637, 638 n.6 (2009) [hereinafter Lavoie, Flying Above the Law]. 
 6 See Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 
971, 974-75 (2003) (noting that reliance upon statistics establishing a high compliance rate 
despite a low audit rate to support the view of a compliant culture is flawed because this 
comparison does not consider the effect of information reporting); see also Leandra 
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1453, 1460 (2003); Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to 
Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 381, 400-01 (2009) [hereinafter Leviner, 
New Era]; Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and 
Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 39–40 (2009) (citing JOEL SLEMROD & JON 
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAXES 178 (3d 
ed. 2004) and INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL 
TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2007), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf); Jay A. Soled, Homage to 
Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371 (2007) [hereinafter Soled, Homage]; Richard 
Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 127 (2009); 
Dave Rifkin, An Overview of the “Tax Gap”, TAXES, Oct. 2008. 
 7 Morse, Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 6, at 39. Susan Morse, Stewart Karlinsky, 
and Joseph Bankman conclude from this data that “[t]he strong relationship between evasion 
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Commentators have spilled considerable amounts of ink proposing solutions to 
reduce the tax gap and to improve tax compliance.8 These proposals tend to reflect 
what is perceived to be causing the tax gap, a complex analysis involving numerous 
economic, psychological, and cultural factors.9 No one has yet proposed a perfect 
grand unifying theory of tax compliance,10 and, as a result, proposals to remedy the 
tax gap often “pull policymakers in different directions.”11  
While most of the proposals to remedy the tax gap have merit, the government 
could not implement all of them, even if it wished to, given the considerable 
                                                                                                                                         
and income source suggests that the primary causal factor that explains evasion is 
opportunity.” Id. at 40. 
 8 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, UPDATE ON REDUCING 
THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009) (for a good 
overview of what the proposed solutions from government are); see also Rifkin, supra note 6 
(for a good overview of various proposals to reduce the tax gap). 
 9 Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1513, 1520 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Community Policing] (“[M]ost taxpayers behave 
like moral and emotional reciprocators: in deciding whether to pay their taxes in full, they are 
more influenced by their perception that others are or are not complying than they are by the 
material costs and benefits of evasion.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to 
Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 609-12, 616 (2007) 
[hereinafter Kornhauser, Morale Approach] (discussing how framing compliance issues for 
the taxpayer; cultural, religious, and psychological attitudes towards taxation; and taxpayers’ 
perceptions of whether their fellow taxpayers are compliant can influence whether a taxpayer 
will be compliant); Lavoie, Flying Above the Law, supra note 5, at 115, 120 (discussing many 
of these factors as well as how taxpayers’ perception regarding the fairness of the tax system, 
the value received from tax dollars, and the level of compliance exhibited by other taxpayers 
can influence compliance decisions); Leviner, New Era, supra note 6, at 407 (discussing how 
religious, moral, and ethical attitudes as well as taxpayers’ inherent trust in government and in 
each other motivate compliance decisions); Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing 
the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 120, 121-26 (2011) 
(discussing that, while classic deterrence theory at first blush seems to describe tax 
compliance by small and medium-sized businesses, this theoretical model is too simplistic to 
describe accurately why taxpayers choose to comply or choose not to comply with the tax 
laws); Morse, Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 6, at 38 (summarizing the seminal 
description of the classical rational actor economic theory of tax noncompliance found in 
Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. 
PUB. ECON. 323, 326 (1972)); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice 
to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009) (discussing how taxpayers’ 
religious, moral, and ethical attitudes can influence compliance decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945 (1996) (“agents are willing to 
cooperate, and hence to solve collective action problems without coercion, if most people are 
seen as cooperators.”); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
431 (2008). But see Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
111 (2009) (criticizing the social norms approach, although providing a nice summary of both 
the traditional and norms-based models). 
 10 Doran, supra note 9, at 138 (“The questions of why taxpayers comply and how penalties 
should be structured to promote compliance remain unsettled and controversial . . . .”). 
 11 Id. at 113. 
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limitations on resources available for tax enforcement.12 Because increasing 
resources for IRS enforcement of the tax laws is not politically viable,13 the 
government inevitably must look to proposals that can reduce the tax gap but that do 
not require more funding for the IRS. The most readily apparent solution, increasing 
potential penalties to compensate for the low risk of detection created by the limited 
enforcement budget,14 also is a practical non-starter on account that such an 
approach would require increasing penalties to such a high level that they would 
become draconian.15 In other words, the IRS has no choice but to do more with less. 
One way for the IRS to accomplish this goal is to attempt to increase the 
likelihood that taxpayers will accurately report their tax liabilities in the first place, 
which would create fewer problems to detect. Conceivably there are multiple ways 
the government could attempt to do this, ranging from adopting policies designed to 
incentivize taxpayers to be more likely to comply voluntarily with the tax laws to 
increasing the transactions that would be subject to third party reporting to the IRS, 
which increases the likelihood that taxpayers will report such transactions 
accurately.16 Because paid tax preparers are playing an increasingly important role in 
the administration of the tax laws,17 such proposals logically should (and, as seen by 
                                                                                                                                         
 12 David Cay Johnston, Change and the IRS, 121 TAX NOTES 1067 (2008) (quoting 
Charles Rossotti, former Commissioner of the IRS, who stated, “The tax system continues to 
grow in complexity . . . while the resource base of the IRS is not growing and in real terms is 
shrinking. Basically, demands and resources are going in the opposite direction. This is 
systematically undermining one of the most important foundations of the American 
economy.”). 
 13 Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 5, at 84-85. A main task of any I.R.S. 
commissioner . . . is to beg Congress and the White House for resources. For all the obvious 
appeal of having the I.R.S. collect every dollar owed to the government, it is just as obviously 
unappealing for most politicians to advocate a more vigorous I.R.S. Michael Dukakis tried 
this during his 1988 presidential campaign, and—well, it didn’t work. Stephen J. Dubner & 
Steven D. Levitt, Filling in the Tax Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006. 
 14 Leviner, New Era, supra note 6, at 401. 
 15 Id. at 402. 
 16 See W. Edward Afield, Dining with Tax Collectors: Reducing the Tax Gap through 
Church-Government Partnerships, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 53 (2010) (for a summary of the 
various proposals that are designed to encourage more voluntary compliance); Soled, 
Homage, supra note 6, at 377; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 17 Leslie Book, The Need to Increase Preparer Responsibility, Visibility and Competence, 
in NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 Annual Report to Congress Vol. II [hereinafter Book, 
Increase Preparer Responsibility]; Sagit Leviner, The Role of Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer 
Compliance: An Empirical Investigation with Policy Implications, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1079, 
1090 (2012) [hereinafter Leviner, Empirical Investigation] (“With the growing number of 
taxpayers who turn to third party preparation assistance, tax preparers have become critical 
gatekeepers for the tax system and its administration.”); Richard Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s 
Keeper? A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations and 
Zealous Advocacy in the Legal Profession, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 813, 827 [hereinafter Lavoie, 
Am I My Brother’s Keeper?] (“[T]axpayers look to, and the efficient functioning of the tax 
system relies on, the advice of tax practitioners to guide them to the most appropriate 
interpretation of the law.”); Margaret McKerchar, Kim Bloomquist & Sagit Leviner, 
Improving the Quality of Services Offered by Tax Agents: Can Regulation Assist?, 23 AUSTL. 
TAX F. 399, 402 (summarizing the increased use of pad tax preparers to file returns in the 
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the IRS’s recent attempts at increasing preparer regulation, in fact do) include steps 
to ensure that the advice offered by paid tax preparers and advisors is as accurate as 
possible. 
Despite increased use of paid preparers, the IRS has historically known 
surprisingly little about who these preparers are and what their level of expertise is, 
although the limited data that does exist suggests that paid preparers have a high 
error rate despite the fact that they supposedly have enough expertise in the tax laws 
that they can sell their tax-related services for a fee.18 Until recently, there have been 
few minimum qualifications in place regarding who is eligible to be a paid preparer, 
and the minimal requirements that exist are poorly enforced.19 Concerned about this 
trend, the IRS commissioned a report in 2009 regarding the return preparer industry 
(published as IRS Publication 4832), which led to the steps the IRS recently took to 
increase the regulatory oversight over all paid preparers.20  
Bringing all paid preparers within the IRS’s regulatory framework to ensure a 
baseline of competence is a good step towards improving tax compliance and 
towards reducing the tax gap. In adopting a mandatory regulatory regime, however, 
the government has missed an opportunity to realize additional compliance benefits 
that could be achieved by shifting towards a voluntary regulatory regime in which 
                                                                                                                                         
United States to the point that paid preparers are involved in both a majority of returns filed 
and taxes reported). 
 18 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 78; Tolan, supra note 1, at 
483-84; Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide 
More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351 (2009). Sagit Leviner summarizes the 
results of a GAO study that is illustrative of the level of the error rate: 
In an effort to collect more information on tax preparers and the quality of service 
they offer their clients, the GAO conducted a field study in 2007. In this study, GAO 
employees visited 19 chain-affiliated tax preparers. Using two hypothetical case 
scenarios drawn from everyday tax circumstances, the GAO employees represented 
themselves to preparers as if they were ordinary taxpayers shopping for tax 
preparation assistance. Strikingly, nearly all of the returns completed by preparers 
during the GAO site visits were incorrect to some extent. Some of the most serious 
deficiencies involved incidents where preparers failed to report side income (ten out of 
nineteen cases), did not itemize deductions at all or failed to claim available 
deductions (seven out of nine cases), did not ask where a child lived or ignored 
relevant information and claimed an ineligible child for EITC (five out of ten cases), 
and failed to take the most advantageous postsecondary education tax benefits (three 
out of nine cases). These deficiencies translated to unwarranted refunds of up to nearly 
$2,000 in five instances, while in two cases they cost the taxpayer over $1,500. 
Further, many of the issues identified in the GAO study put the preparer, taxpayer, or 
both at risk of IRS enforcement actions for violations such as negligence or willful or 
reckless disregard of tax rules. 
Leviner, Empirical Investigation, supra note 17, at 1091-92; Morse, Karlinsky & Bankman, 
supra note 6, at 61-63 (tax preparers are often complicit in the tax fraud of their clients, either 
intentionally or recklessly). 
 19 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 78-79. 
 20 Tolan, supra note 1, at 484. 
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tax preparers could choose to seek certifications indicating whether they had a 
positive track record of compliance.  
Under such a voluntary compliance certification regime with appropriately 
structured participation incentives aimed both at paid preparers and their clients, paid 
tax preparers are not simply mandated to achieve a minimal level of competence; 
they are instead provided with competitive advantages in the marketplace for 
achieving higher levels of compliance than preparers who have poor compliance 
track records. As a result, preparers are more likely to choose to pursue higher levels 
of compliance to obtain and maintain a certification. In addition, many taxpayers are 
more likely to seek out compliance-certified preparers because of the benefits 
associated with relying on advice and filing tax returns prepared by compliance-
certified preparers. This piece seeks to lay the framework for how such a voluntary 
compliance certification program would work and to discuss the benefits of such a 
system that are currently not being realized through the IRS’s current regulation of 
paid preparers. 
Part II summarizes in brief the current regulatory landscape for paid preparers 
and illustrates that the current environment falls short in providing a mechanism to 
allow the government to better direct its enforcement resources and to incentivize a 
culture of compliance among tax preparers and their clients. Part III describes in 
general terms how a voluntary compliance certification system should be structured 
in order to achieve these benefits. Part IV describes in greater detail the compliance 
and related gains that can be achieved through a voluntary compliance certification 
system. 
II. CURRENT PREPARER REGULATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT 
IDENTIFY WHICH PREPARERS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE COMPLIANT AND TO 
INCENTIVIZE A CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE 
Paid preparers fall into three categories: (1) licensed professionals (attorneys and 
CPAs); (2) enrolled agents; and (3) registered tax preparers.21 In addition, although 
they are usually not directly involved in individual tax advice or return preparation, 
tax promoters, who market investment vehicles broadly, are implicated in the tax 
system because they often promote the tax benefits of their products.22 Each category 
has different levels of regulatory oversight and different error rates. Licensed 
professionals have the most stringent requirements (and the best track record of 
compliance) due to the requirements of state licensing boards, whereas registered tax 
preparers subject to the least amount of oversight and exhibit a much higher level of 
noncompliance (and, in fact, until 2011, this group was not subject to any licensing 
or educational requirements).23 
                                                                                                                                         
 21 Leviner, Empirical Investigation, supra note 17, at 1088. The focus on paid preparers 
when discussing preparer regulation is critical because, as Patrick Tolan notes, the statutory 
definition of tax preparer given in IRC § 7701 only covers preparers who do so for 
compensation (i.e., it does not include volunteers, such as those in the IRS’ VITA program, or 
individuals who provide tax advice for friends or family members free of charge). Tolan, 
supra note 1, at 477. 
 22 Doran, supra note 9, at 121. 
 23 Leviner, Empirical Investigation, supra note 17, at 1088-89, 1092, 1119-29. Sagit 
Leviner provides a concise summary of the regulatory distinctions among these categories: 
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To better police return preparers,24 the IRS in 2011 expanded the reach of 
Circular 230, the primary document regulating standards of practice before the IRS. 
As expanded, Circular 230 applies to all paid preparers and requires that all paid 
preparers be registered annually with a preparer tax identification number (PTIN); 
exhibit an acceptable level of character and fitness; successfully complete tests to 
ensure competence; and engage in continuing education. 25 The IRS’s legal authority 
to institute these requirements to all paid preparers, however, is still in question.26 
The standards in Circular 230 are complex, but mirror requirements of IRC § 6694 
(the provision of the tax code that provides penalties to tax preparers), which states 
that paid tax preparers are not permitted to advise a client to adopt a position without 
a reasonable belief that the position is more likely than not to be sustained in 
litigation if the position has a significant purpose to avoid or evade federal income 
tax or is a type of transaction that must be specifically reported to the IRS (even with 
adequate disclosure, this position still requires a “reasonable basis”).27   
In addition to dictating the required level of confidence tax preparers must have 
in rendering tax advice, Circular 230 has for several years set out time-consuming 
and costly requirements for tax preparers to render a “Covered Opinion” that can be 
                                                                                                                                         
Comparing these three groups of preparers, licensed professionals prescribe to a 
heightened degree of scrutiny and training, as they are professionally regulated and 
registered by state licensing agencies. Enrolled Agents are preparers who are not 
professionally licensed, but earn IRS authorization to prepare returns and practice 
before it by passing an examination on tax matters or demonstrating past IRS 
employment experience. Finally, pursuant to the 2011 preparer regulation, all other 
paid tax preparers—previously unregulated—are now required to register and remain 
in compliance with the status of Registered Tax Return Preparer. To become a 
Registered Tax Return Preparer, a preparer must: (1) pass a one-time competency 
examination; (2) pass a suitability check; and (3) obtain a unique PTIN and pay the 
amount required in the PTIN User Fee Regulations. 
Id. at 1088-89. 
 24 See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1 (discussing the pre-2011 difficulties the IRS had in 
monitoring paid preparers). 
 25 Tolan, supra note 1, at 485-86, 503 (noting that certain preparers, such as CPAs, 
attorneys, and those they supervise, were exempt from some of these additional educational 
requirements, as were preparers who certified that they did not prepare returns for 
individuals). Note that there is ongoing litigation regarding whether these requirements can be 
imposed on all paid preparers. See Lipton, supra note 2. Although the government has initially 
lost its claim that it possesses the authority to impose these regulations, the issue is currently 
on appeal. Id. (discussing the IRS’ loss in Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), 
and the status of the subsequent history of the litigation). For the purpose of making 
prescriptive policy arguments in favor of preparer regulation, however, the eventual outcome 
of the litigation is not particularly relevant because even if the IRS loses, Congress could still 
amend the tax code to increase regulation over tax preparers. Id.; Steve R. Johnson, The D.C. 
Circuit Rejects the IRS’s Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/02/johnson-.html.  
 26 Johnson, supra note 25.  
 27 Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?, supra note 17, at 824 (discussing I.R.C. § 6694); 
Tolan, supra note 1, at 503. Promoters are merely prohibited from lying about their product’s 
tax benefits. Doran, supra note 9, at 121 (discussing the promoter penalty of I.R.C. § 6700(a)). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
322 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:315 
used by their clients as a defense to numerous (but not all) penalties28 that can be 
imposed on the taxpayer if he or she is audited and does not prevail on a particular 
position.29 While tax preparers and advisors are permitted to render some tax advice 
without fulfilling all of the requirements of a Covered Opinion, they must explicitly 
state that their clients cannot rely on such advice as a defense to taxpayer penalties, 
significantly reducing the value of such advice.30 Although the IRS Office of 
Professional Responsibility has proposed amending Circular 230 in 2013 to remove 
the requirements for Covered Opinions and to create a standard applicable to all 
written tax advice that is based on reasonableness,31 the effects of such an 
amendment are difficult to predict until the amendment is finalized. As of the writing 
of this piece, the Covered Opinion rules remain in force. 
These attempts to limit aggressive tax planning appear to have worked to some 
degree, but it remains to be seen whether these regulations will prove sufficient to 
improve compliance significantly going forward, as an improving economy leads to 
increased demand for aggressive tax planning.32 Often times, whether a position 
passes muster under an existing regulation is a close call, creating the temptation for 
paid preparers to err on the side of encouraging a client to adopt overly aggressive 
positions.33 In addition, while this increased preparer regulation could help to 
                                                                                                                                         
 28 Steven Z. Hodaszy, Circular Argument: What is Wrong, and Right, with the Circular 
230 “Covered Opinion” Regulations, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 150, 177 (“[A] Non-Reliance 
Disclaimer prevents an opinion from being invoked as part of a reasonable cause-and-good-
faith defense to the imposition of accuracy-related penalties under § 6662 of the Code (or § 
6662A(a) . . . , in the case of disclosed reportable transactions) or fraud penalties under § 
6663.”). 
 29 See id. for a good discussion of the Covered Opinion requirements. 
 30 Id. at 160. 
 31 See Benson S. Goldstein, Amendments to Circular 230 to Remove “Covered Opinion” 
Rules, AICPA (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.aicpa.org/publications/taxadviser/2013/january/ 
pages/dc-currents_jan2013.aspx; see also Florence Olsen, Tax Practice: Proposed Revisions 
to IRS Circular 230 Set New Standards for ‘Reasonable’ Practices, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT 
(Feb. 14, 2013), available at http://www.bna.com/proposed-revisions-irs-b17179872372/. 
 32 Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?, supra note 17, at 852. 
 33 Id. at 825. This temptation can be enhanced by tax preparers operating from an 
inappropriately adversarial perspective with the government, even prior to the onset of 
litigation: 
Moreover, when tax practitioners are involved in planning transactions or assisting 
taxpayers in developing their reporting positions for a completed transaction, it is 
questionable whether such work is truly adversarial, as that term has traditionally been 
interpreted. Our adversarial system of justice contemplates a competition among 
equals that is intended to efficiently and fairly yield the “truth.” Thus, having a 
taxpayer make colorable arguments regarding his proper tax burden is justifiable once 
the issue has been joined with the Government (either administratively or in 
litigation), but making those identical claims on an initial tax return, when no 
adversary has yet entered the ring, impedes the arrival at a fair result. 
Id. at 828; see id. at 828-30 (noting that some argue that such an adversarial relationship is 
appropriate (particularly for attorneys) because of client loyalty and zealous advocacy norms); 
see also Ventry, supra note 9, at 477 (“Prevailing standards based on adversarial norms 
encourage literalist interpretations of the law because such interpretations can provide 
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improve the overall quality of return preparation and tax compliance, it would not 
allow the IRS to better identify which paid preparers are more prone to compliance 
than others, which would be useful information, as the IRS allocates its limited 
enforcement resources.34 This regulatory scheme also only incentivizes preparers to 
meet a baseline level of compliance. It neither provides an incentive for paid 
preparers to compete with each other with regard to how compliant they are, nor 
does it provide an incentive to taxpayers to select the most compliant paid preparers 
to assist them in preparing returns. Part III describes how a regulatory regime over 
paid preparers could be improved from the existing model to achieve these 
additional benefits. 
III. STRUCTURING AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION AND TARGETED 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
Mandatory regulation of all paid preparers is a step in the right direction, but it 
neither goes far enough to allow the IRS to better ascertain who the most compliant 
preparers are nor provides enough incentives for preparers to compete with each 
other over who can achieve high rates of compliance. Shifting to a voluntary 
compliance certification system of preparer regulation would accomplish both of 
these goals. Currently, the different types of paid preparers are primarily 
differentiated from each other based on their education and training. While paid 
preparers with the most training and expertise do provide more accurate advice,35 it 
does not automatically follow, due to the complex interactions between preparer and 
client that drive tax compliance decisions, that the existing classifications 
automatically sort which types of preparers are more focused on intentionally 
maintaining high levels of compliance (and these classifications also do not indicate 
which preparers within each classification are most likely to be the most 
compliant).36 This Part describes how such a voluntary compliance certification 
system could be structured to achieve these benefits that are currently unrealized in 
the current regulatory environment. 
A. Due Diligence and Educational Requirements 
The first goal that a voluntary compliance certification program should have is 
that of encouraging paid tax preparers to be as thorough as possible in collecting and 
verifying information from their clients and to have up-to-date knowledge of the tax 
laws (particularly in areas that exhibit high levels of noncompliance) to help them 
accurately determine their tax liability. In order to obtain a compliance certification, 
preparers should be required to adhere to IRS guidelines that would require them to 
exhibit an increased level of vigilance when advising taxpayers in areas that have 
historically high levels of noncompliance.37 This requirement could provide a much 
                                                                                                                                         
sufficient authority if challenged and litigated. Meanwhile, practice standards based on a more 
likely than not norm reinforce a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.”). 
 34 See Johnston, supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussion of the IRS’ limited 
enforcement resources).  
 35 See Leviner, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 37 See Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 82:  
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needed incentive for tax preparers and advisors not only to comply with the due 
diligence requirements that already exist but also to comply voluntarily with a higher 
level of due diligence that could systematically reduce areas that have historically 
exhibited high levels of noncompliance.38 As part of this requirement, preparers 
would be required to adhere to heightened educational requirements similar to those 
that are currently being litigated in Loving v. IRS in order to ensure that they 
maintain a baseline level of competence.39 
B. Primary Business Requirement 
Related to the concept of increased educational requirements yielding better 
compliance outcomes, paid tax preparers who spend the bulk of their professional 
lives rendering tax advice are more likely to have the requisite expertise for more 
accurate advice and return preparation. Accordingly, to obtain a compliance 
certification, a preparer should be in the primary business of rendering tax advice 
                                                                                                                                         
If research suggests high areas of noncompliance associated with specific types of 
issues, our tax system should more affirmatively impose upon preparers an obligation 
to ask questions that relate to ferreting out facts that will at a minimum (i) place the 
responsibility for taxpayer actions squarely on the taxpayer’s shoulders and (ii) 
discourage preparers from becoming facilitators of noncompliance. 
. . . . 
[W]ith the exception of the EITC [(Earned Income Tax Credit)] . . . , [t]he current tax 
compliance regime does not tie due diligence of the underlying issues, but rather to 
the preparer’s underlying knowledge of individual circumstances that would trigger a 
duty of further inquiry under general negligence principles. 
Id. at 83. Such an increased due diligence obligation should not create any undue conflict 
between tax preparers and clients, because the obligation only “emphasizes the preparers’ 
obligation to inquire about relevant facts, and inform taxpayers about why those facts are 
relevant to complying with the laws, areas that should not legitimately heighten or create 
preparer tensions with clients.” Id. at 88. 
Increasing due diligence requirements could be particularly valuable if applied to advice given 
to and returns filed on behalf of small and medium-sized businesses (“SMBs”). SMBs are the 
largest contributors to the tax gap and have a rate of noncompliance that is significantly higher 
than other groups of taxpayers. Logue & Vettori, supra note 9, at 103, 107-09. SMB 
noncompliance occurs with a small number of SMB taxpayers understating their cash receipts 
significantly and with a large number of SMB taxpayers overstating their deductions by a 
smaller amount. Id. at 110. Because understatement of cash receipts and overstatement of 
deductions are an easy form of noncompliance to engage in even without preparer complicity 
(taxpayers simply do not provide all of the relevant information to preparers), increasing 
preparer due diligence requirements to make inquiries and seek verification of items could 
improve the compliance rate among SMB taxpayers. 
 38 See Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 86 (“[C]urrent research 
shows those preparers often ignore the existing due diligence rules.”). 
 39 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Although attorneys and CPAs would 
arguably already satisfy this component with their continuing educational requirements 
required by their state licensing authorities, it might make sense to mandate education in 
particular areas of high noncompliance even for these groups in order to obtain a compliance 
certification. But see Tolan, supra note 1, at 515-17, 542-43 (summarizing arguments that 
heightened educational requirements are inefficient and ineffective, although Tolan advocates 
for increased training and certification). 
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and/or preparing returns.40 Because preparers who provide tax services as an 
ancillary business generally have the profitability of their full-time business as their 
primary objective, these preparers should automatically raise a compliance red flag.41 
This lack of compliance can particularly impact the administration of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) (which has a high level of noncompliance) because these 
part-time preparers often prepare returns for EITC recipients and redirect EITC 
funds into their primary businesses.42 In addition, part-time preparers are likely 
unable to spend as much time staying abreast of current tax law developments as 
full-time preparers, raising the potential for inadvertent as well as intentional errors. 
Although it is not practical to ban part-time preparers completely, making them 
ineligible for a compliance certification (or perhaps requiring even higher levels of 
testing and/or educational requirements if they wish to obtain a compliance 
certification without having tax advice or return preparation as their primary 
business) could certainly help limit their use and would help the IRS target 
enforcement against this “low-hanging enforcement fruit.”43 
C. Pro Bono Requirement 
The third component of a voluntary compliance certification system would 
require paid preparers seeking certification to complete a fixed number of returns for 
EITC-eligible taxpayers on a pro bono basis.44 This requirement is perhaps a bit 
                                                                                                                                         
 40 Tolan, supra note 1, at 539 (“Perhaps the PTIN application process could be tweaked to 
require applicants working for businesses not primarily engaged in tax matters to identify the 
nature of their primary business. This factor, in isolation or in combination with problematic 
returns from that preparer, could be used to trigger heightened Service scrutiny.”).  
 41 Id.  
 42 Cords, supra note 18, at 368. Compounding this problem is the fact that many EITC-
eligible taxpayers are unaware that there are free tax return services that are available to them. 
Id. at 374 (“The IRS provides assistance to taxpayers who meet its income thresholds through 
its walk-in Taxpayer Assistance Centers (TACs) and the training and the partnerships it forms 
with community organizations through the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program 
(“VITA”) and the Tax Counseling for the Elderly (“TCE”) Program.”). 
 43 Tolan, supra note 1, at 539. 
 44 Rather than requiring such pro bono service, preparers with compliance certifications 
could be given an option of providing the free service or of donating a fixed sum of money to 
an organization that focuses on assisting EITC taxpayers in completing their returns. See 
Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate Legal 
Services for the Poor, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 609 (2011) (arguing for mandatory 
pro bono with a buyout option); Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro 
Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 908, 929 (1996) (noting that mandatory pro bono requirements 
with buyout options can be valuable in raising funds for pro bono legal service, although they 
are criticized as benefitting large firms, which can more easily afford the buy-out than a 
smaller firm); see also Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democrat Critique of Pro Bono Publico 
Representation of the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 129, 168-70 (2001) (arguing that a mandatory buyout in the form of Good 
Samaritan Tax, is actually the more efficient way to ensure that legal services are provided to 
the poor, although he argues that such a tax should be taken from the public at large rather 
than just the bar because the public is receiving the benefit); Debra Burke, Reagan McLaurin 
& James W. Pearce, Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 82-
83 (1994) (allowing large firms to buy out of a pro bono obligation is more efficient than 
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more controversial,45 although, if enacted, it could help the government remedy a 
persistent problem that exists in the area of EITC compliance. The EITC, designed 
specifically to benefit low-income taxpayers, is subject to both intentional fraud and 
unintentional error due to its complexity.46 By increasing the number of EITC returns 
performed by paid preparers who are more likely to avoid both the intentional and 
unintentional errors, the government can go a long way towards remedying this 
problem by guiding eligible taxpayers to preparers who will be best served to help 
them. Paid preparers wishing to obtain and maintain a compliance certification 
would have to market their free EITC services (or volunteer at Voluntary Income 
Tax Assistance (VITA) Centers), which will make it more likely that EITC-eligible 
taxpayers will be served by paid preparers possessing high levels of ability and 
integrity. EITC compliance could be enhanced even further through the voluntary 
compliance certification system if the government permitted only compliance-
certified tax preparers to conduct eligibility prescreening for the EITC and made 
voluntary participation in the prescreening a prerequisite for lower preparer and 
taxpayer penalties and audit rates.47 
D. IRS Monitoring 
Of course, for a compliance certification program to work, the IRS needs to 
improve its system of identifying and monitoring preparers so that it can determine 
which ones are worthy of a certification.48 The IRS’ recent requirement that tax 
                                                                                                                                         
mandatory pro bono because it increases profitability to large firms as well as increases 
funding for legal services to the poor); Debra Burke, George W. Mechling & James W. 
Pearce, Mandatory Pro Bono: Cui Bono?, 25 STETSON L. REV. 983,1007-09 (1996) 
(indicating that a mandatory pro bono system with a buy out option can be structured either to 
incentivize attorneys to actually perform services or to incentivize attorneys to elect the buy 
out option, as attorneys will elect the buy out when the buy out rate is less than the attorney’s 
billing rate); Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: 
From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 157-58 (2002) 
(supporting a buy-out option). 
 45 See Part IV.D. 
 46 Cords, supra note 18, at 368-69. (“Because there are many reasons for EITC 
noncompliance—including errors relating to qualifying children, documentation, record 
keeping, and actual fraud—there is no single means to achieve EITC compliance. . . .  Greater 
oversight and regulation, including more training of tax preparers, could help resolve some 
noncompliance.”). Leslie Book has also written extensively on the causes of EITC 
noncompliance. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of 
Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103 (2006); Leslie 
Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145 
(2003) [hereinafter Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance].  
 47 See Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance, supra note 46, at 1146-49. 
 48 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 88 (“both TIGTA and GAO 
have recently noted that the IRS is limited by the lack of information it captures about 
preparers, and the limited means of monitoring practitioner performance”). Even California 
and Oregon, which do contain preparer regulatory regimes, have historically not done a good 
job of tracking preparers for monitoring or enforcement purposes. Id. at 78. In a system in 
which preparers and their clients will receive different treatment from the government based 
on their compliance history, then institutionalizing the reputations of preparers with the 
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preparers obtain PTIN numbers, combined with mandatory preparer e-filing, is a 
significant step towards increasing the IRS’ ability to monitor tax preparers.49 For a 
robust compliance certification system to be in place, however, more monitoring 
would be required.50 From the current regulatory foundation, the IRS could take 
steps to create a systematic database for each preparer that establishes each 
preparer’s error rate, or at least establishes a reliable estimate of that rate.51 In 
addition, the IRS could annually provide detailed information to tax preparers 
indicating how their returns compare in accuracy to national benchmarks, as well as 
require, as a part of the certification maintenance requirements, that preparers 
demonstrate a certain level of improvement in any areas in which a preparer is 
deemed to be falling below acceptable levels.52 
E. Incentives for Participation 
If compliance certification is to be on a voluntary basis, there must be incentives 
in place to encourage participation and to help the government further the goals of 
resource allocation, as well as better detection mechanisms to justify such 
certifications. Creating a combination of carrots and sticks aimed at tax preparers is 
                                                                                                                                         
government is an indispensable step in ensuring consistent treatment under this system. See 
David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 345 (2006). 
 49 Leviner, Empirical Investigation, supra note 17, at 1134 (“[The mandatory PTIN 
requirement] may serve a key function in effectively facilitating further administrative 
mechanisms in the coming years, including advancing preparer and taxpayer outreach and 
oversight.”); Tolan, supra note 1, at 487, 539-42 (noting that, assuming the IRS develops a 
database to process the data, the PTIN registration process and mandatory e-filing should help 
determine who problem preparers are by allowing the IRS to spot trends exhibiting a pattern 
of noncompliance). 
 50 This increased monitoring would potentially be the biggest roadblock to a compliance 
certification system being successful. While technological efficiencies could likely be 
achieved in constructing an electronic mechanism to conduct most of the monitoring, 
implementing this system would almost certainly have more than a de minimis up-front cost. 
As a result, implementation could run into the same obstacles that exist whenever the IRS 
seeks additional funding to carry out its mandate. See Johnson, supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 51 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 90-91: 
One possibility is that the IRS could create a preparer database that allows the IRS to 
capture compliance related information on each preparer, including, for example, the 
total number of clients and dollars a preparer has in the cash economy, and 
information on client return DIF scores that are outside the norm, math error activity 
on client returns, and examination results. Where a preparer is a member of a firm, 
that relationship presents the possibility of two different perspectives, one at the 
preparer level, and the other at the firm level, provided both the preparer and the firm 
can both be uniquely identified. 
Id. at 90 n.70. 
 52 See id. at 109-10; Tolan, supra note 1, at 482; see also Book, Increase Preparer 
Responsibility, supra note 17, at 115-16 (discussing how this type of monitoring could be 
done by imposing stricter reporting requirements on preparers with high error rates until their 
error rate improves, although not considering this concept in light of providing a compliance 
certification with tangible benefits for both preparers and their clients). 
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of course an important first step in creating appropriate incentives, but, in order to 
maximize the odds that taxpayers would seek out compliance-certified preparers, the 
certification system should provide benefits to taxpayers who use compliance-
certified preparers. This latter aspect is important because incentivizing taxpayers to 
seek out certified compliant tax preparers has the additional effect of incentivizing 
tax preparers to compete for business by being more, rather than less, compliant.53 
These incentives could be structured in many ways,54 but the most significant 
incentives that would actually influence both taxpayers and tax preparers are those 
that can potentially result in significant cost savings for taxpayers who use certified 
compliant preparers. These incentives fall into the following categories: (1) lowering 
of potential penalties for errors committed on returns by certified compliant 
preparers; (2) lowering of audit risk for returns prepared by certified compliant 
preparers; and (3) lowering of the cost of obtaining tax advice.  
1. Lowering Penalties for Compliance-Certified Preparers and their Clients 
With regard to the first category of incentives, both compliance-certified 
preparers and their clients could be subject to lower penalties should a violation of 
the tax laws be discovered on an audit. Commentators have considered the effects of 
                                                                                                                                         
 53 Some commentators have considered the possibility that tax preparers might try to be 
compliant to preserve a relationship with the government for the benefit of future and current 
clients. Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?, supra note 17, at 826, 831 (citing Michael 
Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties, and Advice, 12 FLA. 
TAX REV. 1, 18 (2012)). This reputational motivation, however, may not be as strong as it 
otherwise could, particularly because preparers likely know that, in many instances, the 
government will never know how compliant they are. In addition, tax preparers have been 
moving steadily away from a culture of serving as gatekeepers for the tax system: 
While numerous factors and changes over the recent decades have undoubtedly 
contributed to the shift in the ethical reality of tax practice, four overarching areas of 
change can be easily identified as highly significant in altering the ethical perceptions 
of the tax bar: (1) evolving client norms for ethical behavior; (2) increasing 
competitive pressures on legal service providers; (3) changing judicial approaches to 
statutory interpretation; and (4) a lessening imperative favoring taxpaying in society 
as a whole. 
Id. at 841-42. By coming up with a formal certification and monitoring system and by tying 
that into direct benefits to both preparers and taxpayers, the incentive to comply is much 
stronger, particularly because client business norms have shifted significantly away from 
valuing tax compliance as part of business ethics. Id. at 842-43. In addition, such an incentive 
helps encourage more (although, admittedly not all) preparers to comply with the PTIN 
registration requirements so that they are not “ghost preparers” and can be better monitored by 
the IRS. See Tolan, supra note 1, at 519. 
 54 Leslie Book describes numerous incentives that could be used to incentivize 
compliance, such as: “favored refund time, differing access to the Debt Indicator program or 
access to IRS information generally, differing recordkeeping or due diligence requirements, or 
explicit discretion from Congress for the IRS to modify or waive certain requirements or 
penalties for preparers who meet certain low-error thresholds.” Book, Increase Preparer 
Responsibility, supra note 17, at 113-14; see also Schizer, supra note 48, at 361-62 
(suggesting that the government could keep a list of tax preparers with poor compliance track 
records that could be used to shame those preparers and could create an expedited review 
process for tax advisors who had a reputation for giving conservative opinions). 
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providing different penalties for tax preparers who demonstrate higher levels of 
compliance55 but have not taken the idea far enough to provide an incentive for both 
preparers and taxpayers to work together towards improving compliance. Providing 
lower preparer penalties for certified compliant preparers certainly would be a 
valuable incentive for preparers to seek a certification. Limiting this differential 
penalty treatment to preparer penalties, however, does not necessarily help influence 
taxpayers to seek out the most compliant preparers to assist them in their tax 
planning and filing obligations. This limitation creates an inherent tension between 
taxpayers, who may wish for preparers to engage in more aggressive tax planning, 
and preparers, who would want to preserve their eligibility for the lower preparer 
penalty. This tension could cause tax preparers to avoid legitimate positions in grey 
areas of the law that would interfere with their relationships with their clients 
(particularly when the tax preparers are also attorneys with the requirements inherent 
in an attorney/client relationship).56 This tension is better than taxpayers and 
preparers being aligned towards noncompliance, but it is still inferior to a system in 
which both taxpayers and preparers would have their interests aligned towards 
compliance. 
Accordingly, lower penalties should be extended towards taxpayers who use 
those tax preparers as well. This extension of differential penalty treatment will 
provide a much stronger incentive for taxpayers to seek out certified compliant 
preparers by providing the taxpayers with a tangible benefit from using compliance-
certified tax preparers. This incentive is important because, while compliance 
oriented taxpayers could be channeled towards compliance-certified preparers by 
simply publishing a list of compliant preparers,, reducing potential for penalties does 
more to incentivize compliance-indifferent taxpayers to seek out certified compliant 
preparers to receive better penalty treatment.57  
2. Lowering the Audit Rate on Compliance-Certified Preparers and their Clients 
As for the second category of incentives, the IRS could also provide incentives 
for both preparers to seek a compliance certification and for taxpayers to use 
compliance-certified preparers by committing to lowering the frequency with which 
the IRS audits returns prepared by certified compliant preparers.58 This could take 
                                                                                                                                         
 55 See, e.g., Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 113; Raskolnikov, 
supra note 9, at 691-94 (proposing a dual option tax enforcement system in which the 
traditional system is complemented by a voluntary compliance regime that taxpayers could 
elect and that would involve taxpayers giving up certain rights in exchange for lower 
penalties—a system that more compliant taxpayers would likely elect). 
 56 See infra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticism of how 
misaligned incentives between attorneys and taxpayer clients can have a negative effect on the 
attorney/client relationship. 
 57 See Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 113. 
 58 Id. at 39 n.97, 67; Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?, supra note 17, at 860 
(discussing how this audit strategy could be used to combat aggressive tax shelter activity, and 
observing that “[a] taxpayer who knows that aggressive tax planners serve as audit lightning 
rods has an incentive to seek out practitioners who have a good reputation with the 
Government, and presumably are more evenhanded in their legal conclusions”). 
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the form of either the IRS promising to lower the overall intentional audit rate59 for 
returns prepared by certified compliant preparers or the IRS promising not to audit 
such a return unless it triggers a higher DIF score60 than that which would normally 
trigger an audit. An alternative version of this approach would allow compliance-
certified preparers and their clients to be eligible for a more responsive, graduated 
regulatory approach with the IRS whereby the government would determine its level 
of hostility to or cooperation with a taxpayer based on the taxpayer’s willingness to 
cooperate.61 Relaxing procedural requirements that limit malpractice claims for 
claims brought against non-certified tax preparers would also accomplish many of 
the same effects as providing penalty relief to compliance-certified preparers and 
their clients because tax preparers would not want to risk losing their malpractice 
protections by not obtaining a certification.62   
                                                                                                                                         
 59 The risk that a return would be randomly selected for audit should likely remain the 
same in order to keep the deterrent effect that the random audit risk creates. 
 60 DIF scores, which stand for Discriminant Function System, are a computer scoring 
mechanism that rates returns in order to select returns for audit. The Examination (Audit) 
Process, FS-2006-10, IRS.GOV (Jan. 2006), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Examination-(Audit)-
Process.   
 61 Tolan, supra note 1, at 528. Australia provides a good model for how such a responsive 
regulatory regime would work by using detection and enforcement in combination with non-
punitive measures to increase the overall compliance rate. Leviner, New Era, supra note 6, at 
381. Under this approach, the government would start from a position of cooperation with the 
taxpayer and would provide increasingly favorable treatment if met with taxpayer cooperation 
but would become increasingly adversarial if met with taxpayer resistance. Id. at 417-28. Such 
an approach would be warranted for compliance certified preparers and their clients as there is 
a greater likelihood of honest cooperation from those predisposed to compliance. Thus, 
engaging in responsive regulation with those who have already demonstrated a higher 
propensity for compliance could cause any disputes to be resolved much more quickly and 
efficiently outside of the adversarial context. See id. at 426 (arguing that one of the purposes 
of such a system is to prevent enforcement resources from being marshaled when no violation 
occurred). Limiting responsive regulation to this subset of preparers and taxpayers mitigates 
against the concern that taxpayers predisposed to noncompliance might actually increase their 
noncompliant behavior under the assumption that, if they are discovered, they could hopefully 
engage in cooperation with the government to attempt to limit their liability. See id.  
Note that in order to be worthwhile, the value of increased compliance would have to 
outweigh the potentially significant costs associated with such a program. Raskolnikov, supra 
note 9, at 707 (observing that a responsive regulation approach would potentially require two 
sets of auditors); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Enforcement for Gamers: High Penalties or 
Strict Disclosure Rules?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 62 (2009) (two sets of auditors 
would likely require either significant retraining or hiring, and both approaches would have 
high costs). 
 62 See Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and their Implications for Tax 
Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 315-30 (2008). Soled proposes the following reforms in 
the abusive tax shelter context: (1) tolling the statute of limitations and limiting the use of 
arbitration clauses in the tax shelter malpractice context; (2) prohibiting abusive tax shelter 
promoters from relying on a “mere error in judgment defense”; (3) increasing the amount of 
potential recovery in malpractice cases; (4) encouraging taxpayers to settle with the 
government by making penalties easier to recover; (5) prohibiting insurance carriers from 
covering claims related to abusive tax shelters; and (6) publishing the names of tax preparers 
who receive judgments. Id. at 322.  
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3. Lowering Costs and/or Increasing Value Associated with Tax Advice 
With regard to the third category of incentive, one concern regarding a 
compliance certification program is that it would increase costs on tax preparers, 
which would either be passed on to clients or would potentially drive tax preparers 
out of the industry.63 Combatting this concern is another reason why there must be an 
incentive structure in place for both tax preparers and taxpayers to want to 
participate in this certification program. The most straightforward savings 
mechanism would be simply to provide a refundable tax credit equivalent of the 
amount usually spent on filing a routine tax return to taxpayers who use compliance-
certified preparers.64  
Another possibility would be relaxing some of the Circular 230 requirements for 
compliance-certified preparers (a step that may already be underway with regard to 
all paid preparers).65 One way to accomplish this would be to allow taxpayers to rely, 
for the purposes of penalty protection, on what Circular 230 terms a “reliance 
opinion.”66 Reliance opinions can currently be given to taxpayers without following 
the Covered Opinion regulations, but cannot currently be used for penalty 
protection.67  
Another way to incentivize participation would be to allow Covered Opinions 
and/or Reliance Opinions to serve as penalty defense to the new accuracy-related 
penalty for transactions lacking economic substance, which currently is a strict 
liability penalty.68 The compliance certification should make the tax preparer 
                                                                                                                                         
 63 Tolan, supra note 1, at 513-14. Increasing costs could also have the negative effect of 
causing fewer taxpayers to use paid preparers, which could increase the potential for errors in 
tax return preparation. See, e.g., McKerchar, Bloomquist & Leviner, supra note 17, 405, 419 
(noting that, in addition to fewer taxpayers using paid preparers, more preparers might go 
“underground” and continue preparing returns without being monitored by the government). 
In addition, compliance costs “are largely a deadweight loss when they are costs of 
investigating items of legal or factual uncertainty.” Mark P. Gergen, Third Party Opinions as 
a Tool for Enforcing Tax Law, available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/taxlaw/ 
pastseminars/200809papers/GergenMarkTaxOpinions.pdf. 
 64 Costs of tax preparation are already deductible but, at least for individual taxpayers, 
these expenses are itemized deductions under I.R.C. §§ 212 and 62, which they cannot always 
take because of I.R.C. § 67’s 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. I.R.S. Pub. 529 
(Nov. 13, 2013). 
 65 See Goldstein, supra note 31; see also Olsen, supra note 33. 
 66 Hodaszy, supra note 28, at 154 n.8 (a reliance opinion is a written opinion in which the 
tax preparer has concluded that there is a greater than fifty percent chance that the taxpayer 
will prevail on a federal tax issue that the government has a reasonable basis to challenge and 
that could significantly impact the tax treatment of whatever transaction the opinion is 
addressing) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(3), (4) (2010)). 
 67 Id. at 177. Steven Hodaszy advocates limiting the scope of Circular 230 even further, so 
that it only covers tax shelter opinions. Id. at 190 (“The chief problem with the Covered 
Opinion Regulations is that they apply not only to tax shelter opinions, but also to advice 
concerning virtually all other tax matters.”). 
 68 Id. at 184-86 (discussing I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6)). Allowing Covered Opinions (or even 
Reliance Opinions) to serve as a defense to the § 6662(b)(6) penalty would better help 
practitioners to continue to serve as key players in improving tax compliance: 
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rendering the opinion more inherently trustworthy, which should allow their 
opinions to serve as insurance policies for the taxpayer without creating a significant 
noncompliance risk. This relaxing of Circular 230 requirements would make the 
advice much more valuable, justifying a higher premium. This value premium, 
however, would likely flow to the client, as tax preparers and advisors would be able 
to render useful tax advice in considerably less time than it takes to render a Covered 
Opinion, making these reliance opinions less costly than a Covered Opinion but just 
as valuable.69  
These additional incentives are essential because without them, unscrupulous 
taxpayers would be tempted to avoid compliance-certified preparers in favor of 
preparers who would be more inclined to engage in noncompliant behavior to the 
benefit of the taxpayer (or in favor of self-preparation).70 In addition, tax preparers 
and advisors have shown that they will not maintain high compliance standards just 
because of professional ethics and aspirational goals,71 making an incentive structure 
all the more necessary. 
IV. BENEFITS OF A COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION AND TARGETED ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAM 
A compliance certification program would lower the tax gap if a sufficiently 
large number of preparers obtained certifications because more paid preparers would 
have higher competency levels, as would also be the case if current IRS efforts to 
strengthen regulation of paid preparers were permitted to be enforced in their 
entirety. In addition to improving the quality of preparers, however, a voluntary 
compliance certification program would achieve additional benefits. Such a program 
would create a market for compliance that would incentivize tax preparers to 
compete with each other over how compliant they are and would incentivize 
taxpayers to value compliance history in selecting a tax advisor.  Thus, a compliance 
certification program would not only increase competency, but would help establish 
compliance as something of value which could help the tax bar transition to a more 
                                                                                                                                         
To the extent that the § 6662(b)(6) penalty supplants other accuracy-related penalties 
with respect to tax shelters, the effectiveness of the Covered Opinion Regulations in 
creating a “gatekeeper” role for tax practitioners threatens to be severely undermined. 
If a covered opinion no longer provides insurance against the most probable accuracy-
related penalty to be imposed on a tax shelter, clients will be likely no longer to view 
the receipt of such an opinion as a prerequisite to entering into an aggressive 
transaction. (This is particularly true in light of the high transaction costs that the 
regulations impose on such opinions). In turn, if a client no longer views a covered 
opinion as a necessity when investing in a tax shelter, then a practitioner’s 
withholding of such an opinion will no longer function as a strong impediment to the 
client’s participation in an abusive deal. Much of the Covered Opinion Regulations’ 
deterrent effect on taxpayer behavior will thus be lost. 
Id. at 186.  
 69 See id. at 171, 177. This more efficient rendering of tax advice can make taxpayers 
more likely to seek out tax advice more often because they can be confident that they can ask 
a succinct question and get an equally succinct answer to a tax question (and rely on that 
answer) without incurring the cost of a Covered Opinion. Id. at 171. 
 70 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 98. 
 71 See Hodaszy, supra note 28, at 167, 179. 
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compliance focused culture. In addition, such a system would help the IRS focus its 
enforcement efforts on tax preparers and taxpayers who, because of a lack of 
certification, are more likely to exhibit noncompliant behavior. This Part discusses 
these potential benefits in greater detail. 
A. Increased Accuracy and Higher Rates of Compliance 
If sufficient numbers of preparers sought and obtained compliance certifications, 
overall accuracy in tax reporting would likely improve. The preliminary evidence for 
this actually exists on the state level, as California, Maryland, New York, and 
Oregon have imposed heightened educational and certification requirements on paid 
preparers for a long enough period of time that there is data attesting to the efficacy 
of such programs, so long as they are properly structured.72 The best data comes 
from Oregon’s program, which has the most stringent requirements and has existed 
for a sufficient period of time that inferences can be drawn from the data.73 Although 
further research must be conducted to rule out other factors, initial data reveals that 
Oregon’s program has led to an overall increase in tax compliance among Oregon 
taxpayers.74 In addition, Oregon’s example shows that holding preparers to higher 
regulatory standards without forcing them out of the marketplace is in fact possible.75 
B. Norm Shifting 
A compliance certification, if coupled with other incentive structures, potentially 
can yield significant dividends in changing tax preparer and taxpayer attitudes 
regarding the importance of tax compliance. Both preparers and taxpayers tend to 
fall into one of three categories: (1) the intentionally noncompliant; (2) those who 
are indifferent to compliance; and (3) the intentionally compliant.76 Although 
                                                                                                                                         
 72 See, e.g., I.R.S. Pub. 4832 (rev. Dec. 2009); Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, 
supra note 17, at 46 (citing a GAO report indicating that federal returns prepared by Oregon 
paid preparers 72% higher odds of being accurate than comparable returns filed in the rest of 
the country, while federal returns prepared by California paid preparers had 22% lower odds 
of being accurate than comparable returns filed elsewhere); McKerchar, Bloomquist & 
Leviner, supra note 17, at 412-20; Tolan, supra note 1, at 474 n.3. 
 73 McKerchar, Bloomquist & Leviner, supra note 17, at 411-12. Oregon’s program has 
existed since 1973 (as opposed to 1997 for California) and requires significantly more training 
and education in order to be licensed than the California program. Id. at 411 (summarizing the 
requirements of both programs in detail). 
 74 Id. at 418 (“In summary, the analysis for three performance measures found that 
individual taxpayers in Oregon who are clients of tax agents have a lower probability of 
experiencing math errors, are less likely to have underreported interest income in excess of 
$10 and have, overall, higher voluntary reporting rates. However, the question that remains to 
be answered is whether these observed differences are due solely or even primarily to 
Oregon’s program of tax agent education and licensing or whether they result from another 
factor or combination of factors unique to Oregon.”). 
 75 Id. at 419-20 (arguing that Oregon illustrates that such regulation might signal to 
taxpayers that paid preparers offer a higher quality product, which could encourage more 
taxpayers to use paid preparers with the confidence that they are receiving higher value). 
 76 Book, Increase Preparer Responsibility, supra note 17, at 80 n.27 (citing Yuka Sakurai 
& Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayer’s Perceptions of the Ideal Tax Adviser: Playing Safe or 
Saving Dollars? (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 5, 2001), available at 
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noncompliant taxpayers often attempt to seek out preparers who are already 
predisposed towards noncompliance, it is possible that compliance-oriented tax 
preparers could have a positive influence on taxpayers predisposed towards 
noncompliance.77 This positive influence would not necessarily be limited to the 
individual level, but would occur on a macro level as well.  
A good compliance certification system would provide both direct and indirect 
incentives for tax preparers to have a good track record of reaching the correct result 
rather incentives to have a history of simply “winning” against an adversary (the 
government).78 Establishing these incentives is important to counter the predictable 
fact that currently tax preparers often appear to mirror their clients’ attitudes 
regarding aggressive tax positions unless their behavior is reigned in through 
deterrence incentives.79 This change in focus by preparers could potentially lead to a 
                                                                                                                                         
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/5.pdf. Book breaks these three broad categories into six 
sub-categories: 
1. Refusing practitioners—these practitioners refuse to engage in a relationship with 
clients they suspect to be dishonest or overly aggressive; 
 
2. Signaling practitioners—these practitioners will signal their unwillingness to 
prepare returns for clients they expect to be dishonest by making detailed inquiries or 
requesting back-up documentation; 
 
3. Facilitating practitioners—these preparers facilitate noncompliance by advising the 
taxpayer how to take improper return positions when they know or reasonably believe 
that the taxpayer is misstating facts; 
 
4. Indifferent practitioners—these preparers are indifferent to the taxpayer’s conduct 
and are willing to follow taxpayer preference and overlook noncompliance; 
 
5. Incompetent or unsophisticated practitioners—given the due diligence 
requirements, these preparers should be able to recognize that the taxpayer is taking 
improper positions, but are unable to detect or suspect taxpayer misconduct because of 
lack of training, education sophistication, etc.; and  
 
6. Reasonably unknowing practitioners—despite the client’s misconduct, the 
practitioner does not and cannot reasonably know or suspect that the facts the taxpayer 
alleges are incorrect. 
Id. at 80 n.28 (citing Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer 
Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in 2007 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CON. 71 (Taxpayer Advocate Series) [hereinafter Book, Role of Preparers]). 
 77 Id. at 80 n.27 (citing Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 76, at 71); Hodaszy, supra 
note 28, at 180 (“[T]o deter abusive tax shelters effectively, a regulatory scheme must not only 
prohibit bad behavior by tax practitioners; it must actually enlist the aid of private practice tax 
attorneys in reigning in their clients.”); Leviner, New Age, supra note 6, at 425; Schizer, supra 
note 48, at 333. 
 78 Ventry, supra note 9, at 443. 
 79 Michael L. Roberts & George F. Klersey, Effects of Experience, Task Specific 
Information, and Risk on Tax Professionals’ Judgments, 7 (Aug. 5, 2011) available at http:// 
papers.ssn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1905127; McKerchar, Bloomquist & Leviner, 
supra note 17, at 404–07. In addition to reflecting clients’ attitudes, tax preparers also exhibit 
confirmation bias in overly valuing evidence that supports positions favorable to their clients 
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positive shift in the underlying compliance norm, driving tax advice and causing 
both preparers and taxpayers to become more focused on getting it right rather than 
on getting away with it.80 Furthermore, this change in focus could improve 
compliance by uniting the incentives of the government, tax preparers, and 
taxpayers, which would be more likely to bring about a norm shift than many 
existing proposals that require preparers to develop an adversarial relationship with 
their clients in order to police them.81 These shifts in attitudes could be a significant 
                                                                                                                                         
while undervaluing evidence that would support a contrary position. Roberts & Klersey, supra 
at 7. Because of the complex nature of the tax advisor/client relationship, however, the 
multiple studies in this area have led to some inconsistent findings regarding whether the tax 
advisor or the client is the primary instigator of noncompliant activity. McKerchar, 
Bloomquist & Leviner, supra note 17, at 406 (“[T]he literature is not entirely clear as to which 
party is responsible for the adoption of an aggressive tax stance and the extent to which such a 
stance is affected by contextual conditions including penalty exposure, opportunity, personal 
circumstances, and attitudes.”). 
 80 See Ventry, supra note 9, at 477-78. Solutions that contribute to shifts in compliance 
norms have the potential of being a more efficient mechanism of having a longer lasting effect 
on increasing tax compliance than proposals that simply try to increase enforcement or try to 
work with existing norms without trying to change them. Elizabeth Branham, Note, Closing 
the Tax Gap: Encouraging Voluntary Compliance Through Mass-Media Publication of High-
Profile Tax Issues, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1507, 1525 (2009); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 909, 930 
(describing how “norm entrepreneurs” can produce “norm bandwagons” around a new norm, 
which in turn can cause more and more people to begin adhering to the new norm until a 
“norm cascade” occurs, causing a permanent shift in the norm). But see Hope M. Babcock, 
Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New 
Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2009) (discussing some of the difficulties 
in changing norms generally, which can include: (1) combatting myths regarding the source of 
the problem; (2) preventing free riding on a collective benefit; and (3) drawing connections 
between norms and tangible actions).  
This certification program with its incentives can be much more effective in drawing these 
potentially norm-changing connections between tax preparers and compliance norms than 
simply increasing preparer standards without an incentive structure because the incentives will 
encourage preparers to market their certifications more directly to clients, illustrating the 
benefits of compliance norms. See Tolan, supra note 1, at 526-27 (“[Compliance-oriented 
preparers] would also signal to their clients a compliance norm that could then, in turn, 
motivate the taxpayers to be more compliant.”); Schizer, supra note 48, at 45 (“Lawyers will 
want conservative reputations, and clients will want to hire such lawyers, if the government 
treats opinions of conservative lawyers more favorably than opinions of aggressive ones.”). In 
addition, the certification system itself can redefine which conduct is considered to be 
compliant by adopting a penalty structure in which taxpayers are potentially subject to higher 
penalties if they do not use compliance certified preparers (thus making the use of these 
preparers an aspect of what constitutes full compliance with the tax laws). Doran, supra note 
9, at 145 (the structure of penalties serves a definitional function of describing what is 
considered to be compliant conduct). 
 81 Commentators who have argued for a stronger gatekeeping function nevertheless have 
to harmonize this gatekeeping function with traditional notions about an attorney/client (or 
accountant/client) relationship. See Tolan, supra note 1, at 534-35 (proposing that preparers be 
required to police tax payers for noncompliance); Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?, supra 
note 17, at 828, 830 (discussing how some commentators are critical of proposals that weaken 
the attorney/client relationship in the context of tax advice, although still arguing for tax 
preparers to serve a gatekeeping function). Structuring incentives so that preparers and 
 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
336 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:315 
step towards improving “tax morale,” whereby taxpayers will begin to see tax 
compliance as a civic virtue.82 
C. Targeted Tax Enforcement 
In addition to improving tax morale, compliance certification combined with 
targeted tax enforcement better utilizes government resources and produces more 
just outcomes by focusing the most lengthy and adversarial enforcement efforts, as 
well as the most significant penalties, on taxpayers and preparers who are most 
likely to be noncompliant.83 This benefit is better realized with a voluntary 
compliance system as opposed to mandatory regulation because it helps sort tax 
preparers into groups that are more and less likely to be compliant and then uses 
market pressure to remove those predisposed to intentional or negligent 
noncompliance from the marketplace.84 For these efficiency gains to be realized, 
however, the factors that determine what should trigger an audit for clients of 
certified and non-certified preparers would need to be continuously adjusted.85 While 
keeping the audit benefits afforded to certified-compliant preparers completely secret 
might lessen the desired incentivizing effects, some details would have to be kept 
confidential to lessen the temptation of preparers to try to obtain a certification only 
to manipulate it for its benefits.86  
D. Enhanced EITC Compliance 
The certification program would also increase EITC compliance and make 
claiming the EITC more viable for taxpayers. If completing a certain amount of 
                                                                                                                                         
taxpayers are unified in a desire to be more compliant can increase tax preparers’ role as 
gatekeepers without actually requiring them to do so in a way that might weaken the 
relationship with the client. 
 82 See, e.g., Kornhauser, Morale Approach, supra note 9, at 599; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
Tax Compliance and the Education of John (and Jane) Q. Tax Payer, 121 TAX NOTES 737 
(2008) (describing her efforts to increase “tax morale”).  
 83 Admittedly, it can be difficult to determine ex ante which tax preparers and tax payers 
are more likely to be compliant because of the complex array of factors that drive compliance 
decisions. See Doran, supra note 9, at 129-30 (arguing that it is difficult to separate taxpayers 
into different types because of the various factors that influence tax compliance decisions). 
This uncertainty can be problematic because, if more responsive regulation is applied across 
the board, noncompliant taxpayers might try to exploit it through innovation designed to 
lessen the likelihood of detection in a more relaxed enforcement environment. Ventry, supra 
note 9, at 459.  
 84 See Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 709 (discussing an elective compliance regime as a 
potential signaling mechanism for which taxpayers are predisposed towards compliance). The 
preparer monitoring that would be part of the compliance certification system would also 
serve as an additional verification of the compliance predisposition to ensure that such a 
predisposition has not changed with a particular preparer. 
 85 See Logue & Vettori, supra note 9, at 121-24 (discussing how an audit strategy 
designed to use presumptions regarding whether a taxpayer is being compliant for the purpose 
of directing audit resources would need to be changed constantly and would likely not be able 
to be fully publicized to avoid taxpayers adjusting their behavior to appear more compliant 
based on these presumptions). 
 86 See id. at 144. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/5
2014] A MARKET FOR TAX COMPLIANCE 337 
 
EITC returns free of charge were a requirement for certification, tax preparers 
seeking the certification would be more likely to advertise their free EITC services to 
taxpayers, and such services would become more widely available. Taxpayers would 
receive the dual benefit of being better guided towards a free service and having a 
more highly trained preparer assist them in preparing their returns.87 Enforcing the 
EITC preparation requirement for certification, along with the other requirements 
that are designed to ensure that only highly compliant preparers receive certification, 
would address the concerns that shifting more EITC work to paid preparers would 
not improve EITC compliance because of concerns over the paid preparers’ motives 
and training.88 
E. Shaming Benefits 
If the government promulgated a list of compliance-certified preparers and took 
steps to increase public awareness of this list and of the benefits of using these types 
of preparers, tax advisors and preparers who were absent from the list might have an 
additional motivation to qualify for certification because of shaming effects.89 Such 
programs have already been successful on the state level when applied to taxpayers 
directly.90 For shaming benefits to be realized, however, the government would have 
to attract a sufficiently large population of preparers to the certification program, 
otherwise the shaming effect could backfire if preparers see that the vast majority of 
their peers are not seeking certification and are thus not necessarily furthering 
compliance norms.91  
F. Reduction in Burdens Imposed by Circular 230 
The ability of relaxed Circular 230 requirements to reduce costs and add value 
for compliant-certified preparers has been discussed supra.92 In addition to these 
benefits, limiting the scope of Circular 230 to provide more flexibility for 
                                                                                                                                         
 87 See Cords, supra note 18, at 374 (noting that many taxpayers are unaware of the free 
services that already exist, and, because the current free services comprise volunteers and still 
commit errors on account of insufficient training). 
 88 Compare id. at 389-90 (arguing for more resources to be devoted for free filing 
assistance because shifting work to paid preparers may not lead to increased EITC 
compliance), with Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance, supra note 47, at 1135 (arguing for 
imposing additional requirements on paid preparers to improve EITC compliance). 
 89 See Jay A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little Shame Might Just Deter Tax 
Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at 11A; see also Leviner, New Era, supra note 6, at 
408; Schizer, supra note 48, at 361-62. Note that, as with the targeted tax enforcement 
benefits, the shaming benefits are enhanced by keeping the compliance certification program 
voluntary as opposed to mandatory. 
 90 Soled & Ventry, supra note 89 (“Shaming has helped states collect hundreds of millions 
of dollars in unpaid tax bills as taxpayers have rushed to expunge their names from the lists.”). 
 91 Lavoie, Flying Above the Law, supra note 5, at 637; Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity, 
supra note 5, at 85; Kahan, Community Policing, supra note 9, at 1519 (suggesting that, 
because most taxpayers base their compliance decisions on whether they observe their fellow 
citizens complying with the tax laws, the government could tap into this reciprocity norm and 
increase tax compliance through policies that promoted trust among taxpayers).  
 92 See supra Part III.E.3. 
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compliance-certified preparers takes Circular 230 a step closer to addressing the 
legion of complaints that have been raised against it as being: (1) overly broad; (2) 
overly complex; (3) overly costly; (4) an impediment to attorney-client 
communication and to the rendering of tax advice in a piecemeal fashion as issues 
arise; (5) a restriction on the professional judgment of tax preparers and advisors; (6) 
the cause of the over-use of Non-Reliance Disclaimers to the point of making them 
ineffective; and (7) an opt-out system that creates many of the above-mentioned 
problems as opposed to being an opt-in system.93 Relaxing these requirements could 
also encourage compliance-oriented tax preparers to take more pro-taxpayer 
positions in good faith in legitimate gray areas of the tax law because there would be 
fewer costs in doing so. These challenges, if filed more frequently, could serve as a 
signal to both the IRS and Congress regarding what gray areas exist and how they 
should be clarified to produce the proper interpretation in the future. 
G. Benefits of Mandatory Pro Bono EITC Representation 
In addition to improving the EITC compliance and providing more access to low 
income tax payers to experienced return preparers who can assist them in obtaining 
the credit, requiring mandatory pro-bono EITC representation as a condition of 
compliance can serve larger societal goals. For tax preparers who are attorneys, 
imposing this requirement would better bolster the inherent obligation of the legal 
profession to provide representation to the poor.94 Despite this inherent obligation 
and despite the fact that some local private bar associations have mandated pro bono 
service,95 the imposition of a universal mandatory pro bono requirement on the bar 
has met with resistance both on precedential and constitutional grounds.96 These 
arguments, in brief, are: (1) the nonexistence of a right to counsel in civil cases; (2) 
the weakness of the historical argument for attorneys being officers of the court for 
the purpose of rendering pro bono service; (3) mandatory pro bono constitutes an 
                                                                                                                                         
 93 Hodaszy, supra note 28, at 169-79. 
 94 Philip P. Houle, Is Mandatory Uncompensated Pro Bono in Civil Cases Constitutional?, 
3 NEV. LAW. 20, 20 (1995). This obligation is based not only on fundamental values reflected 
in the oath of attorneys but also on the fact that attorneys occupy a monopoly position in the 
marketplace based on the privileges associated with their law licenses, thus enhancing the 
obligation to provide service to the poor. See id.; Burke, McLaurin & Pearce, supra note 44, at 
67; Burke, Mechling & Pearce, supra note 44, at 987; Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A 
“Public Assets” Theory of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 
(1997) (providing a good history of the relationship of the bar to pro bono services and 
advocating for a mandatory pro bono requirement under a theory that lawyers are deriving 
gains from a public asset and a mandatory pro bono requirement is simply a public recapture 
of some of those rents).  
Nitza Milagros Escalera, A Christian Lawyer’s Mandate to Provide Pro Bono Publico 
Service, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1998) (noting that, in addition to the arguments for 
mandatory pro bono that apply generally, lawyers who profess to adhere to a Christian ethic 
have a particular duty to provide pro bono legal service); Maute, supra note 44, at 91 
(providing a good historical overview of the bar’s attitudes towards pro bono service and 
noting the influence of the discussion of incorporating religious faith into legal practice). 
 95 See, e.g., Escalera, supra note 94, at 1393; Burke, McLaurin & Pearce, supra note 44, at 
61. 
 96 Houle, supra note 94, at 20.  
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/5
2014] A MARKET FOR TAX COMPLIANCE 339 
 
impermissible taking of the attorney’s property without just compensation; (4) state 
constitutional protections of property; (5) lack of judicial authority to order 
uncompensated service in civil cases; (6) lack of judicial authority to order 
mandatory pro bono service; (7) the lack of a true monopoly in the legal profession 
because of the possibility of self-representation; (8) the right to an occupation is a 
fundamental right under the 14th Amendment; (9) mandatory pro bono infringes on 
First Amendment rights by compelling attorneys to participate in cases to which they 
are morally opposed; (10) mandatory pro bono constitutes involuntary servitude (an 
argument that has not gained traction); (11) lack of reciprocity in that attorneys 
rendering pro bono service or not having their costs reduced; (12) mandating charity 
weakens the moral value of charity by removing its charitable character; (13) 
administrative difficulties that would likely result in an approved list of eligible 
recipients that would exclude religious groups and other organizations an attorney 
might choose to represent for free.97 In addition to the arguments that focus on the 
negative effects on the attorney required to render mandatory pro bono service, 
arguments have been raised that such a requirement is economically inefficient 
because it potentially results in bad legal advice from attorneys who are not experts 
in the area in which they are representing clients pro bono98 and because it overly 
steers legal services to the poor beyond the point at which the poor value them.99  
By limiting the pro bono requirement specifically to the EITC area, such a 
program better utilizes practitioners’ pro bono time because it enlists them in an area 
in which they have expertise as well as in an area that is a specifically identified area 
                                                                                                                                         
 97 See, e.g., id.; Omar J. Arcia, Objections, Administrative Difficulties and Alternatives to 
Mandatory Pro Bono Legal Services in Florida, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 771 (1995) (arguing 
that, in addition to the other objections that have been raised, mandatory pro bono could 
significantly increase the administrative burdens on the state on account of its having to 
administer such a program); Atkinson, supra note 44, at 129; Burke, Mechling & Pearce, 
supra note 44, at 983; Escalera, supra note 94, at 1393; Burke, McLaurin & Pearce, supra 
note 44, at 61; Michelle S. Jacobs, Pro Bono Work and Access to Justice for the Poor: Real 
Change or Imagined Change?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 509 (1996) (rejecting many of the traditional 
legal challenges to mandatory pro bono but arguing that mandatory pro bono, while having 
some benefits, is insufficient to help the poor escape poverty on account of complex structural 
issues at the root of poverty); Lubet & Stewart, supra note 94, at 1245 (summarizing, but 
rejecting, many of the classic challenges to mandatory pro bono); Nitta, supra note 44, at 909. 
In addition, Jonathan Macey points out that, even when such a requirement can be permissibly 
imposed, attorneys are not treated equally because large firm attorneys have a much easier 
time fulfilling the requirement than small-firm attorneys or solo practitioners. Jonathan R. 
Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare of the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1115, 1121 (1992) (arguing that large firms can use pro bono requirements as a training 
ground for young associates, while smaller firms are forced to absorb more of the cost of 
providing free legal services because they do not receive a similar benefit to their cost 
structure); Atkinson, supra note 44, at 148 (arguing the same); Scott L. Cummings, The 
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (arguing the same). 
 98 Arcia, supra note 97, at 786-87; Burke, McLaurin & Pearce, supra note 44, at 75; Nitta, 
supra note 44, at 925. 
 99 Macey, supra note 97, at 1118 (arguing that mandatory pro bono cases steer attorneys 
into predominantly landlord/tenant and family law matters in which the costs associated with 
providing the legal services do not outweigh the benefits). But see Nitta, supra note 44, at 922 
(noting that, in Nevada, statistics showed that there were legal needs of the poor that were not 
being met, even with attorneys providing pro bono service). 
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of need.100 In addition, the pro bono requirements are simply a minimum for 
certification and could create a culture in which preparers with compliance 
certifications perform even more EITC (or other voluntary tax) work pro bono as 
they achieve a tangible benefit on taxpayers’ lives by helping them secure these 
valuable credits.101 
Furthermore, the pro-bono EITC requirement could be helpful in creating the 
norm shift towards more compliance described supra because it can help tie 
compliance-certified tax preparers to Judeo-Christian values that, for a majority of 
the United States population,102 can potentially influence their perception of the 
importance of tax preparers and tax compliance generally.103 Pro bono service is a 
fundamental obligation for the Christian attorney.104 By tying pro bono service to the 
requirements for a compliance certification in the tax context, the government can 
better illustrate the moral and ethical dimensions of tax practice and tax compliance. 
As a result, the moral and ethical aspects of tax compliance could better resonate 
with Judeo-Christian religious organizations and cause them to realize that they have 
an obligation to be key players in the effort to shift the country towards being a more 
tax-compliant culture.105 
                                                                                                                                         
 100 Maute, supra note 44, at 155 (noting that, due to the diversity in the legal profession, 
pro bono requirements are better dictated on more local or regional issues); Arcia, supra note 
97, at 783 (noting that one problem with mandatory pro bono is the mismatching of attorney 
expertise to pro bono legal matters); Cummings, supra note 97, at 112 n.674 (arguing the 
same); Nitta, supra note 44, at 933 (arguing the same); Burke, McLaurin & Pearce, supra note 
44, at 74-75 (arguing the same). 
 101 See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Pro Bono Publico as a Conscience Good, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 977, 984 (2009). 
 102 I focus on the connections between public service and Judeo-Christian values because 
of how interconnected Judaism and Christianity are and because together they encompass 
approximately 81.8% of the United States population. See United States (General), 
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TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 67-69 (2004) (discussing moral issues relating to taxation in 
Islam). 
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pro bono that apply generally, lawyers who profess to adhere to a Christian ethic have a 
particular duty to provide pro bono legal service); see also Maute, supra note 44, at 98 
(providing a good historical overview of the bar’s attitudes towards pro bono service and 
noting the influence of the discussion of incorporating religious faith into legal practice). 
 105 Afield, supra note 16, at 53 (arguing that tax compliance norms can be improved 
through partnerships between the government and Judeo-Christian religious organizations that 
are designed to promote tax compliance as a moral obligation); Stuart P. Green, What is 
Wrong with Tax Evasion?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 220, 222 (2009) (arguing that compliance 
gains can be achieved if a norm shift could occur that would move taxpayers’ view of tax 
compliance as being morally ambiguous to being morally wrong); Susan Pace Hamill, An 
Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 
671–674 (2006) (arguing that the only valid metric with which tax policy can be analyzed is 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the IRS has realized that paid preparers are playing an increasingly prevalent 
role in assisting taxpayers in complying with the tax laws and that such preparers 
nevertheless have high error rates, it has understandably taken steps to try to increase 
the quality of these preparers in the hopes of reducing the tax gap. Although 
mandatory regulation that ensures a baseline of competency for all paid preparers is 
an improvement over the prior system of minimal regulation, the IRS is giving up 
compliance gains that could be achieved by restructuring its preparer regulatory 
regime as one of voluntary compliance certifications. If tax preparers are offered the 
opportunity to obtain a compliance certification if they meet certain requirements 
and are then rewarded with lower penalties, reduced audit risk, and lower costs for 
both themselves and their clients, they (as well as their current and potential clients) 
will have a stronger incentive to improve compliance. Taxpayers’ compliance 
incentives would also be better aligned with those of tax preparers, increasing the 
possibility of a norm shift towards a greater culture of tax compliance. In addition, 
the government could use the allure of these incentives to set the requirements for 
certification at a level that will be more likely to produce increased compliance in 
areas that have traditionally exhibited high error rates. At first blush it may seem 
counterintuitive that a voluntary regulatory regime would achieve more benefits than 
a mandatory one. Given the IRS’s resource limitations that prevent effective 
enforcement of the tax laws, however, the most realistic approaches to improving tax 
compliance necessarily rely on providing market incentives for tax preparers and 
taxpayers to value compliance. To do more with less, the IRS must raise the tax bar 
to meet it as it strives for a more just and efficient tax system. 
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